Free-rider problem: Difference between revisions
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[[File:lighthouse.jpg|400px|thumb|right|Figure 1. The Amedee Lighthouse on the French overseas dependent territory of New Caledonia.<ref>Wikimedia Commons. [Online], Available: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Amedee_Lighthouse_-_New_Caledonia.jpg [Aug 17, 2016]</ref>]] | [[File:lighthouse.jpg|400px|thumb|right|Figure 1. The Amedee Lighthouse on the French overseas dependent territory of New Caledonia.<ref>Wikimedia Commons. [Online], Available: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Amedee_Lighthouse_-_New_Caledonia.jpg [Aug 17, 2016]</ref>]] | ||
<onlyinclude>When a person (or company) enjoys the benefits of a [[public good]] without contributing to the [[cost]] of it, they are known as a '''free-rider'''.<ref>A. Goolsbee, S. Levitt and C. Syverson. ''Microeconomics''. New York: Worth Publishers, 2013, pp. 674.</ref> These free-riders become a problem when trying to account for fair distribution of cost, hence the '''free-rider problem'''. National Defense suffers from the '''free-rider problem''', if a person does not pay for national defense, they cannot be exempt from its benefits (i.e. being protected from an attack).</onlyinclude><ref>J.B. Taylor. ''Economics''. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995, pp. 512.</ref> | |||
<onlyinclude>When a person enjoys the benefits of a [[public good]] without contributing to the [[cost]] of it, they are known as a '''free-rider'''. | |||
To combat the free-rider problem, '''user fees''' can be charger to ensure that all who benefit from the use of the public good contribute to its cost. Lighthouses are an example of a public good which everyone (any ship using its light) benefits from but not every ship pays for the service it provides. If ships were charged a fee every time they used the light house (a fee at the port they enter) then the free-ride would not exist.<ref>J.B. Taylor. ''Economics''. pp. 513.</ref> | To combat the free-rider problem, '''user fees''' can be charger to ensure that all who benefit from the use of the public good contribute to its cost. Lighthouses are an example of a public good which everyone (any ship using its light) benefits from but not every ship pays for the service it provides. If ships were charged a fee every time they used the light house (a fee at the port they enter) then the free-ride would not exist.<ref>J.B. Taylor. ''Economics''. pp. 513.</ref> | ||
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==References== | ==References== | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:43, 4 August 2026
When a person (or company) enjoys the benefits of a public good without contributing to the cost of it, they are known as a free-rider.[2] These free-riders become a problem when trying to account for fair distribution of cost, hence the free-rider problem. National Defense suffers from the free-rider problem, if a person does not pay for national defense, they cannot be exempt from its benefits (i.e. being protected from an attack).[3]
To combat the free-rider problem, user fees can be charger to ensure that all who benefit from the use of the public good contribute to its cost. Lighthouses are an example of a public good which everyone (any ship using its light) benefits from but not every ship pays for the service it provides. If ships were charged a fee every time they used the light house (a fee at the port they enter) then the free-ride would not exist.[4]
See Also
Excludable Non-Excludable Rival Private good Common resource Non-Rival Club good Public good
References
- ↑ Wikimedia Commons. [Online], Available: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Amedee_Lighthouse_-_New_Caledonia.jpg [Aug 17, 2016]
- ↑ A. Goolsbee, S. Levitt and C. Syverson. Microeconomics. New York: Worth Publishers, 2013, pp. 674.
- ↑ J.B. Taylor. Economics. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995, pp. 512.
- ↑ J.B. Taylor. Economics. pp. 513.

